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The use of digital platforms by autocracies for info warfare represents a new facet of 21 st century diplomacy. On the other hand, digital diplomacy offers an effective tool for democratic states to bypass the controlled media in authoritarian states.

A specific case of representation dilemmas in the 21 st century occur in divided societies. On the one hand, this would seem to grant diplomats more leeway. But, on the other hand, the lack of firm and consistent policies, standpoints and instructions complicates life for diplomats significantly. Populism yields a democratic representation problem. The U. Among U. In addition, staffs are recruited among member-state diplomats. The representational function of EU delegations is well established and EU diplomats take an active part in the local corps diplomatique.

Sceptics wonder how the two sets of career streams in the Commission and the Council Secretariat can be fused. The emergence of the EU as a diplomatic persona has not replaced, but merely added a new layer to, traditional diplomacy. Nor are there indications that other supranational entities than the EU will be granted similar diplomatic status and representation in the foreseeable future.

Regions and cities are then not recognized as diplomatic personae with representation of their own. Nor are constituent states in federal governments. However, there is an increased activity of subnational units. Today, some authors speak of a renaissance of cities as international actors. Subnational levels of federal nations constitute a special case.

Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Bavaria are other examples of regional diplomatic representation. States and international institutions are engaging TNAs as policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives. Actors behind popular digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have a considerable political impact by how they organize our access to information.

However, in a passive way, these platforms already impact the way diplomacy is conducted as well as the international standing of diplomats. In sum, one may speak of a transnational turn in diplomacy. In this chapter, I have pointed to some, but by no means all, contemporary issues of representation. I have raised questions, but have not provided any answers. As for non-state representation, the uncertain future development of the EU will determine the significance of the supranational challenge, with no rival regional diplomatic actors in sight.

The transnational challenge, on the other hand, has transformative potential by eroding the exclusive cross-border authority of states. Representation, in sum, is best understood as a process rather than a static relationship. It is a process of mutual interaction between principals and agents. The most fascinating aspect of technological disruption is its remarkable capacity for both destruction and creation.

On the other hand, by laying the groundwork for new economic or social opportunities, they also stimulate new thinking and innovative practices that reinforce and sustain these technologies in the long term. This observation may prove particularly valuable for understanding the evolution of digital diplomacy and the extent to which the recent adoption of digital technologies by Ministries of Foreign Affairs MFAs will be able to substantially change the way in which diplomacy is practiced, or whether it will have only a marginal effect on its mode of operation.

The first mega-trend actively encourages digital adoption and is driven by the dual process of rapid acceleration of technological disruption, on the one hand, and the MFAs commitment to thrive in an increasingly competitive environment, on the other hand. The 5G technology, which is due to arrive in just a few years, will likely usher in a whole new level of technological disruption, which could lead to the mass adoption of an entire range of tech tools of growing relevance for diplomacy, such as virtual reality VR and augmented reality AR in public diplomacy or artificial intelligence in consular services.

Augmented reality AR adds digital elements to a live view often by using the camera on a smartphone. Virtual reality VR implies a complete immersion experience that shuts out the physical world. Using VR devices such as HTC Vive, Oculus Rift or Google Cardboard, users can be transported into a number of real-world and imagined environments such as the middle of a squawking penguin colony or even the back of a dragon.

In fact, as Sandre points out, the future is already here. At the lower end of the complexity scale, chat-bots now assist with visa applications, legal aid for refugees, and consular registrations. Staying ahead of the technological curve will likely require a cognitive shift from following to anticipating and possibly pushing new trends.

However, by anticipating new trends, they could better operate in an increasingly competitive digital environment and set the rules and standards of digital practice before others have the chance to do it. For example, by mining open-source data from social media, satellite imagery and blogs, the Embers project sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity IARPA has generated, since , highly accurate forecasts of influenza-like illness case counts, rare disease outbreaks, civil unrest, domestic political crises, and elections.

DDS consists of three key layers. The first layer is demand driven and connects institutional actors, groups and stakeholders that directly benefit from digital diplomatic programs. It may include diaspora groups in need of good digital consular services, embassies in critical spots facing public diplomacy challenges, and think tanks providing consultancy to MFAs on digital matters. The second layer is functional and task-oriented.

Diplomatic engagement requires a minimum level of shared understanding and mutual openness in order to work. Such possibility arguably dissipates when emotions overwhelmingly frame and dominate the discourse by which opinions are formed online, and when facts are pushed into a secondary or marginal position.

Emotional commodification i. As the connection between emotions and social media becomes stronger and more sophisticated, the question of how digital diplomats can adapt to an emotionally charged form of social communication can no longer be ignored. In short, DEI could facilitate careful digital navigation through emotion-laden situations and steer the conversation back on a path informed by fact-based reasoning.

MFAs and governments should therefore invest in the education of their staff to be better equipped to navigate this digital environment. Recent studies have shown that up to 15 percent of Twitter accounts are in fact bots rather than people, and this number is bound to increase in the future.

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It is also important to remind ourselves that digital diplomacy is not supposed to be an end in itself, but rather to inform and serve foreign policy objectives. Robo-trolling i. Digital diplomats may not be therefore able to prevent AI from disrupting their relationship building activities, but they may contain some of its negative ramifications. Digital enthusiasts working in embassies may seek to push ahead with experimentation and innovation, especially in public diplomacy, and with varying degrees of success.

One way in which this tension could be mitigated is by drawing on the output vs. In sum, managing strategic entropy is a matter of understanding how to prioritise and balance digital outputs vs. If technological acceleration will be seen as an opportunity for ecosystem-based, pro-active, and network-oriented adaptation, then digital diplomacy is likely to penetrate the deep core of the diplomatic DNA.

Rather than joining current affairs commentary on the impact of social media in international politics, we will, in this chapter, first turn to literature that can help throw a light on underlying issues. It is our aim to inform the study of diplomacy as well as diplomatic practice with relevant theoretical insights and conceptualizations from this field. We conclude with general policy recommendations for MFAs. Agreement on essential terminology and a shared understanding of core concepts matters — and is not just relevant for academics.

Before arriving at conclusions about the impact of technological change in the practice of international relations, it is worthwhile to continue reflecting on the capacities of these new technologies. New warfare tactics used by Russian military intelligence during the U. Concretely, such societized diplomacy results in new dynamics in government-society relations and, arguably, more domestically oriented MFAs.

Many international challenges of our time have acquired some kind of digital dimension, such that their corresponding technologies provide a platform for social, political and economic activities that could be understood as being computationally formalized. Facebook and Google have already been attempting to tackle problems such as filter bubbles and fake news from a technical standpoint — yet, they may greatly benefit from the perspective of those specialized in interpreting and resolving the nature of such issues, such as conflict and misinformation.

Digital literacy would then range from engaging with ready-made software as a user all the way to coding it, gaining leverage over how users shall access it and what it allows one to do with it. In the same way that certain companies conceive of sociality, transportation or marketing in terms of information and information systems, digital diplomacy would invite policy to conceive of entities, processes, strategies and values relevant to diplomacy at least partly as computational entities.

Digital literacy would then also refer to the ability to take on computation as a form of governance attuned to contemporary instruments of power, such as software. MFAs have therefore started thinking about the fundamental implications of digital transformation for the physical structures of their headquarters and embassies. To be sure, the advent of social media has shown entirely new dynamics in the relationship between diplomacy and technology. Following the Arab Spring, a variety of international crises between and were major learning opportunities for governments.

One important consequence of these fast-moving developments is that the governance of the digital realm needs to catch up. In recent years, some western governments have lost their relative innocence. The practices of digital communication and outreach to foreign and domestic audiences do in fact seem to have disrupted public diplomacy to an extent that deserves urgent examination. Mechanisms constituting digital technologies can be actively used as tools to operationalize political and diplomatic interests. As diplomacy is increasingly enacted in a digital environment, diplomats should be critical of real-life actors behind software, of their intentions and how they pursue their aims, and to what effect.

Mechanisms constituting digital technologies can be used as a medium to operationalize political and diplomatic interests. The number of organized and institutionalized actors actively participating in the international sector is steadily increasing. In addition, new partly-, pseudo- or quasi-governmental actors have come along. The way foreign policy is conducted needs to adapt continuously.

Situations involving crisis and conflict in particular require intense communication among all involved parties. In Europe, Berlin will very often be one of the involved capitals. This inclusive effort mitigates the problem of asymmetrical influence between larger and smaller states, but is not enough to solve it. During immediate and time-sensitive cases, communication increasingly takes place directly between capitals. Not merely the formal meetings of heads of government or specialized ministers, but also the numerous other formal and informal bi- and multilateral meetings.

At these meetings opinions are expressed and agreements are reached that relativize the coordinating function of the foreign ministries in European affairs. In addition, all relevant federal ministries in Germany have established task forces concerning international and European policy aspects of their ministries.

Official representation of federal states at the EU is functioning similarly. In the case of the newly created Alternative for Germany AfD Europe-wide coordination of anti-European parties has only just begun. Many of these parties belong to parliaments or governments on national levels. The role of party associations on the European level is significantly weaker than the role of national parties.

In that respect, national and European politicians can exert influence in this area. Diplomats are often affected by the agreements thus made, but are seldom involved and sometimes insufficiently informed. Due to the informal nature of these kinds of meetings and agreements, so far very few studies have examined their role.

Finally: Foreign policy is traditionally seen as the prerogative of the executive branch. There is only one institution in the transatlantic relationship whereby members of parliament on both sides of the Atlantic can regularly meet for an intense dialogue regarding foreign and security policy issues: the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

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One outstanding concrete example demonstrates how the Parliamentary Assembly can exert influence. Several years before the German Federal Government and the U. The strengthening role of national parliaments in the diplomacy of their countries is thus something new, and governments benefit from contributions coming from different perspectives. It is possible that diplomats are thus not yet adequately prepared for these changes. But one thing is certain: the foreign ministries must prepare for the consequences of an emerging need to deal with new, increasingly influential actors when they revise their structures and procedures.

In short, in the field of geoeconomic diplomacy money alone cannot secure influence. Particularly in the European context such certain non-state actors play pivotal roles in determining the foreign policy options that diplomats enjoy at the international level. Such legal frameworks will only be efficient if they are loyally implemented by businesses actors and other government representatives. Particularly in the European context such non-state actors therefore play pivotal roles in determining the foreign policy options that diplomats enjoy at the international level.


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This analytical insensibility towards the nuts and bolts of the geoeconomic field also bears normative consequences. Considering in a systemised way the role of domestic actors in foreign policy making, such as is prevalent in a great deal of literature on Foreign Policy Analysis and diplomacy studies, is in itself obviously far from being a novel approach. I argue that insights from the rapidly growing literature on network theory in IR could serve as a viable bridge in building such analytical frameworks. While the former Russian move led to asset freezes and visa bans for individuals, the latter incident resulted in general economic sanctions adopted by the EU Council in July , essentially banning much economic activity with the Russian banking, energy and military sectors.

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Analysts have described how the potentially divi sive question of imposing significant, strong economic sanctions against Russia has yet not torpedoed EU consensus on the matter. Here are some primary examples:. On the one hand, Chancellor Merkel and her Chancellery were actively engaged in the sanction negotiations from a very early stage of the conflict, while promoting a sturdier and more confrontational line towards Moscow than that preferred by the SPD-led MFA.

The competencies that diplomats need to operate at the interface between foreign policy, economics and business were at the heart of a significant speech by U. Such reflections on the special nature of geoeconomic diplomacy obviously relate to more general discussions about the agency of non-governmental actors in modern diplomacy. The logic of technological change seems to demand governance, and therefore international politics, of a density and quality that so far has been largely confined to politics within a state. That same logic also operates beyond the nation state.

In fact, the logic of technological change seems to demand governance, and therefore international politics, of a density and quality that so far has been largely confined to politics within a state. At the same time, domestic politics itself is changing under the transformative impact of globalization. Expectations concern material benefits as well as normative or ideological aspirations. Consequently, expectations are rising rapidly, and quite possibly exponentially. The ability of politics to respond to rising needs and expectations for governance within and beyond the state may have grown in many instances, though there have also no doubt been cases of decline and regression e.

Yet there exists a fundamental mismatch between, on the one hand, the realities of interdependence and rising expectations, and on the other, the capacity for global governance within an effective international order. As a result of this tension, the outcomes of global governance tend to fall short of what is needed and expected. Sigmund Freud took up the concept and similarly used it to denote certain behavioural anomalies in his patients. The concept has occasionally been used as a metaphor in International Relations IR theory.

Edward Luttwak is the other author who has used the concept of autism. For these purposes, I define foreign policy autism FPA as follows:. As Senghaas and others have shown, such dysfunctional perceptions of world politics tend towards auto-immunization. The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle. Nevertheless, to highlight the difference when evaluating national foreign policy performances is meaningful — and important.

This trend has been mirrored also at the level of party systems. Not all of these factors will necessarily strengthen autistic tendencies in foreign policy-making, and some may well even work against them. Disruptive FPA ultimately reflects the divisive, corrosive impact of globalization on Western societies. Moreover, the FPA metaphor can identify weaknesses in foreign policy decision-making such as the misrepresentation of the external environment in a foreign policy or its emotional baggage , and suggest ways to address them.

Political choices will need to be made against a backdrop of uncertainty and unpredictability. Recently the differences have been exacerbated by migration pressure. The latter bear the hallmarks of FPA in both its forms: inefficiency and emotional bias. While the nature of the crises may demand major change, it is not clear whether the decision-making capacities of the EU are capable of such change.

Its responses to changing material circumstances due to technological advances and to rising expectations and demands appear to be lagging behind, often with a widening gap. Diplomacy may therefore find itself more and more constrained in its scope and in its ability to promote change through arguments because of problems rooted in FPA. Yet superior national power is unlikely to bridge the gap and compensate for the lag, for several reasons. Third, faced with such difficulties, international cooperation may opt for face-saving pseudo-solutions and compromise formulas that fall far short of what is necessary.

States will continue to exist, and probably continue to play the principal role in international politics. Their governments will carry on interacting with each other through diplomacy.

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This, in turn, would affect the recruitment of diplomats and their professional ethics. Thus, they would exhibit a capacity to manage the conflicting pressures from within and from the outside world in ways allowing them to optimize their enlightened national self-interests by interacting responsibly and empathically with others. This is what the world will need from its diplomats. Whether outdated notions of sovereignty and tendencies towards FPA will allow them to do their job well depends on the capacity of states, and specifically of European and Western democracies, to take corrective action to re-define their own roles in global governance and to overcome those worrying tendencies.

The immediate challenge becomes how to master these tools before — or better than — rival state and non-state actors. This view of digital diplomacy as a diplomatic tool satisfies only a first-level analysis. The second-level analysis involves apprehending those ways in which the media are fostering new diplomatic spaces. These diplomatic spaces are animated by public participation, expectations, and needs, including profound identity needs.

Nevertheless, mastering the dynamics of these spaces is critical. For the rational, pragmatic state actor, digital and social media accord unprecedented global reach and enticing potential for diplomatic innovation. Recent digital diplomacy reports by private and government researchers highlight the obstacles and opportunities regarding digital media for diplomacy and foreign ministries. Digital diplomacy has become increasingly reliant on innovations in strategic communication. Strategic communication is instrumental in the competitive pursuit among countries to enhance their soft power.

Networking can transform static messages into more dynamic strategic narratives. Digital media have brought state and non-state actors into reciprocal contact with the very same publics that they are trying to influence. The results appear mixed. Surprisingly perhaps, aggressive strategic communication may aggravate rather than enhance global relations. Nye posited that the pursuit of soft power would improve relations. Researchers now question that assumption, citing the competition for soft power among Asian countries as a driver of greater friction than friendship.

Strategic communication appears less precise with diverse, global publics. Furthermore, these groups were often able to use counter-narratives for their purposes of radicalizing and recruiting. Research suggests that the intent to influence can be met with greater resistance as attitudes are hardened rather than changed. The result is polarization. Conspicuously overlooked in analyses of the power dynamics between states and even non-state actors in digital diplomacy is the participation of publics in the diplomatic equation. The online environment represents a place for people to meet and interact.

The new diplomatic space is not defined by its actors so much as by its communication dynamics. The new diplomatic space is not defined by its actors — whether state, non-state or publics — so much as by its communication dynamics. Phenomena such as Brexit, Trump, and anti-immigrant sentiment are part of those consequences. Emotions permeate nearly every aspect of the online experience, from the hand-held nature of the electronic devices, to the immediacy of real-time personal interaction, to visuals that sear our sensibilities. The popularity of virtual and augmented reality gaming, for example, rests in part upon immersive media technologies that heighten emotional involvement.

In these new diplomatic sites, emotion and political action coalesce to become personalized. Personalized self-defined politics can undermine larger social institutions and protocols that maintain social cohesion. They are sharing stories. While the Arab Spring was initially heralded as a social media revolution, researchers now credit the story-driven nature of the phenomenon. Emotionally powerful stories can even override hard facts.

Online anger can become offline outrage. In the online environment, identity can be a shared feeling. An incident among domestic publics or with the government can go viral, with global implications. Publics are not just identifying with others through emotion. Shared emotions also can create community. Emotional perspective taking and empathy are also pivotal recruitment tools.

The challenge of digital diplomacy is not about digital tools or learning a new medium of communication. The challenge is navigating the dynamics of emerging public diplomatic spaces, which are sprouting online and then flourishing offline. This trend is likely to intensify. Traditionally, diplomats have mediated identities and relations at the state level and from the state perspective. They also did so in a familiar and well-cultivated diplomatic space behind closed doors.

If digital diplomacy is to achieve in the public domain what traditional diplomacy has achieved behind closed doors, it must move beyond state-centric strategic communication aimed at influence. Public participation and public needs are part of the diplomatic calculus. Diplomatic innovation will mean developing public-centric diplomatic instruments for monitoring emotional dynamics, mediating identities and negotiating conflicts in the public domain. Pro-active diplomacy initiatives may engage publics around identity issues, bridging the domestic with the global. Practitioners, on the other hand, want to know what concrete conclusions can be drawn from this exploration.

Are there necessarily consequences to be drawn for politics, the work of diplomacy, and or changes to be made to diplomatic instruments? The fracturing of our societies, a process which is accelerating this century, has given rise to this fragmentation. Therefore in diplomacy we are engaging with and responding to an increasing variety of actors that span many different and coexisting public spheres. This process of pluralization is likely to intensify. The new publics therefore want to influence the implementation of foreign policy through diplomacy according to their topics of interest.

Publics may claim that a government should behave differently from what the political leadership wants; meanwhile, the government claims to represent the interests of the public properly. These conflicts shatter the confidence of the public in their political leadership, and can tear a society apart. Diminishing confidence in political leadership can be seen in a positive light. First the legitimacy of a government and then that of a state as a whole is in ever greater danger of becoming paler and less effective. This raises the question of whether a state can still act effectively and efficiently.

Digital techniques are establishing themselves as instruments of diplomacy with dramatic effects. The importance of digital connectivity, however, lies not only in technology, which could be compared with, for example, the introduction of the telegraph in the 19 th century or the fax machine in the 20 th.

With the application of technology itself, there comes a shift in the understanding of the very contents of communications. Information is processed using the available technology. The pressure is magnified by an awareness of competition with other actors. The competition probably has the same technical capabilities but may have different goals. Recent public discussions about Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.

Thus, the initiators — whoever they may be — can introduce topics as they please to the diplomatic institution, usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the politicians at its head, and they may present them for public discussions. The emergence of new pathways for public engagement has political consequences and concerns the control of public opinion — and thus also of politics.

Digital communication can become propaganda in the broadest sense. Coupled with the demands of new publics for participation and their distance from the state, this may mean that governments are gradually losing the ability to conduct their affairs satisfactorily. Emergent communication technologies can lead to significant changes for the essence of diplomacy by engaging it in the everyday life of a society.

Of course, digitization is technology too. The danger of overlooking essential information, for example, can only be avoided or mitigated by carefully thought-out technical processing. More important, however, is the handling of social media and their expected future products. At the same time they must have a philosophy for their application and development, based on the culture and values of a country as well as the purposes of a state. The differentiation of trade and traffic between states, the increase in the number of countries with considerable international influence, the loss of order in the international state structure, and doubts about the validity of the rules for liberal international order have clearly recognizable consequences.

They are, like national actors, different, but also similar to one another; profit- or ideology-oriented, they compete or cooperate with one another. These are mostly economic and financial in nature and exercise the use of force by non-military means to solve problems that cannot be resolved through negotiation. Given these complex losses in international structures and increasing difficulty in navigating them, there are more and more attempts by state actors to withdraw into their nation-state frameworks.

It is difficult to see how a solution can be found here without an enforcing international authority that is able to direct peaceful international conduct. That is a fundamental task of foreign policy itself. Ultimately, we can provide only approaches and signposts at a time when questions are becoming more common concerning international politics. The authors of this volume hope that their reflections will be helpful for the orientation of all who are politically concerned with the redesign of diplomacy.

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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, — Kahler, Miles, ed. Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Kitchin, Rob. The Data Revolution. Koch, Michael. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, Koops, Joachim A. Leira, Halvard. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, 28— London: SAGE, A new Europe of small nations Catalonia Basque country Spain In announced its refusal to the use of military actions Belgium Padania and Veneto What do all this separatist movements have in common?

What might happen to new independent European states? Will they be part of the EU? To redefine the purposes of integration Euro skepticism 2. To redefine where the emphasis will go: enlargement or deepening 4. To defeat the phantom of the war or a renewed Cold War: Ukraine conflict and the relationship with Russia 5.

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The EU does not have a single constitution a single government, a single foreign policy, a single taxation system contributing to a single exchequer, or a single military 6. France and Netherlands reject the Constitutional Treaty in referendums in Summer , EU leaders suspend the ratification deadline 7. The Treaty of Lisbon of has not being fully implemented Limited financial and administrative resources necessary for building up policy expertise and exert influence via arguing b.

Small states can achieve influence at EU level but that influence depend on: 1. Counterbalancing strategy commonly used by European small states according Panke 1. Institutionalized coordination 2. Strategic bilateral partnerships to big countries 3. Prioritization of issues 4. Contacts to the Commission 5.

Presidency as opportunity structure for national Small European microstates Who are they? What are their common characteristics? Why microstates and no micro nations? Small European microstates 1. Survivors from pre capitalist era 2. Geographic location that facilitates isolation mountains, islands 3. Open economies and dependence on global markets 4. Integrated in the EU and special agreements to use the euro 5.

Sectorial protection policies in vulnerable sectors agriculture Participating countries are: 1. Andorra 2. Cyprus 3. Iceland 4. Liechtenstein 5. Luxembourg 6. Malta 7. Monaco 8. Montenegro 9. Christine Ingebritsen , University of Washington Press, , pp. You just clipped your first slide!